. Other research examines how to create a sense of threat or fear in others (Peters, Ruiter, & Kok, 2013; Peters, Ruiter & Kok, 2014) . Further, although a variety of forms and contexts of threats are reviewed, the focus of this analysis will be on interpersonal threats-threats expressed by one person to another person. Finally, the interest of this analysis is more on identifying linguistic threats themselves, rather than identifying the threatener (see: Abbasi & Chen, 2008; Hadjidj et al., 2009) , even though each of the two approaches may have much to offer the other. The purpose of this analysis is to examine the nature of expressed threats, identify some of their linguistic features potentially amenable to machine learning, and to provide a rating scale that could assist in validating training sets of threats for such machine learning and classification. To the extent that a reasonably accurate threat surveillance system could be developed, it could significantly enhance the identification, assessment, and potential interventions associated with existing case-based threat management situations.
There are laws proscribing communicated threats as a particular form of unprotected speech (e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 875(c)). The Supreme Court, however, when assessing the legality and seriousness of threats, tends toward an abundance of caution in regulating such speech. In recent cases on threats in electronic media (e.g., Watts v. United States, and Elonis vs. United States), the court has ruled that there is an objective intent standard burden of proof-the prosecution has an expectation to demonstrate a mens rea requirement that the communicator intended the message as a threat, and that it would be understood by the target as a threat (Maras, 2015) . Yet, the Court has not specified the standard for determining what communication features constitute a "true threat." In so doing, the Court left the seriousness of threats to be determined by their context and the subjective intent of the speaker.
Threat is often associated with fear, dread, terror, anxiety, and apprehension (Shen & Dillard, 2014) , and the sense of threat is no doubt an evolved sensitivity with adaptive value and neural substrates (Pichon, de Gelder & Grèzes, 2009) . When uttered or expressed, however, threats are a prima facie indicator of risk, although not everything perceived as a threat or as threatening is predicated on an intentional threat message (Rick, Mania, Gaertner, McDonald, & Lamoreaux, 2010; Smith & Morra, 1994; Spitzberg, in press; Surface, 2011) . Threats reveal a complex relationship to actual harm. From a forensic perspective, threats are generally understood as a risk indicator of potentially violent, criminal or terrorist behavior (Meloy, Hoffmann, Guldimann, & James, 2012) . As Meloy (2000) pessimistically summarizes: "Most individuals do not act on their threats. Threats may increase, decrease, or have no relationship to subsequent violence" (p. 166). The degree to which threats are systematically predictive of violence varies from context to context. For example, threats are more associated with violence in workplace, school, and intimate relationships than in public figure contexts (Jenkins, 2009) . Even among attacks on college campuses, threats were apparent in only 13% of attacks (U.S. Secret Service, 2010).
Other research, however, demonstrates some value of threats as predictors of subsequent violence. Threats have been identified as risk indicators of potentially violent, criminal or terrorist behavior (Meloy, et al., 2012) , stalking (Churcher & Nesca, 2013; Spitzberg & Cupach, 2014) , and femicide (Campbell et al., 2003; Glass, Laughon, Rutto, Bevacqua & Campbell, 2008 (Spitzberg & (Brewster, lass, Laugh ll, 2008; P richsen-Rohl Dubin, Lion 1996) , social herapists (B oren, Miller, andberg, M (Brown tions (Bullin Collins, 2 , 2012; l & Cornell, uer, 2014; B son, 2010; C ski, 2010 2. Negative valence: The act implies some harm(s) or undesirable consequence(s) to the target(s); 3. Implicit or explicit issuer control: The issuer is actually in control of, and/or attempts to communicate self-efficacy and control over, the means of the occurrence of the harm(s); 4. Issuer's Preferred Outcome: The issuer suggests or specifies a demand or course of action on the part of the target that may avert the harm; 5. Contingency: The issuer suggests or specifies that the probability or severity of the harm is probabilistically related to the target's behavior. That is, the target may avert the harm by complying with or fulfilling the issuer's preferred outcome; 6. Credibility and willingness: The issuer's efficacy (i.e., capability of enacting or enabling the harm) and the likelihood or probability of instantiating the harm are either implied or specified as part of the message; 7. Subjunctive Mood: Threats tend to be directed toward future possibilities, even though they often refer to past perceived wrongs or transgressions, and threats may presage future contingencies through present action (e.g., vandalism in the present may be a message of what may happen in the future if demands are not met).
From this pragmatic approach, threats are typically conceptualized as a form of conditional speech intended to influence or gain compliance from a target recipient or agent, even when the proximal motive may be expressive in nature. Such inquiries have often focused on differentiating threats from predictions (Kissine, 2008) , promises, advice, warnings (e.g., López-Rousseau et al., 2011; Wood & Quinn, 2003) , and anger (Frick, 1986; Sinaceur, van Kleef, Neale, Adam, & Haag, 2011; Sinaceur & Neal, 2005) . For example, warnings say that there is a risk of a bad event occurring that is not under the control of the speaker (as in a friend or family member telling their daughter "you are headed for trouble" or "anyone who dresses like that is asking for it"). In contrast, a threat is a statement of a punishment under the control of the threatener that is implicitly or explicitly contingent upon the noncompliance of the target with the threatener's demands ("if you don't do what I ask, I will make you regret it").
Another potential asymmetry is between promises and threats. Promises tend to obligate behavior upon compliance based on positively-valenced outcomes, whereas threats relinquish the issuer from obligation upon compliance based on negatively-valenced outcomes, even though in essence, "a threat is always accompanied by a promise and vice versa, thereby making obligation as consubstantial to threats as to promises" (Salgueiro, 2010, p. 224; see also Castelfranchi & Guerini, 2007) . Promises also tend to imply an acquiescence of the receiver, who can "deactivate" the promise, whereas threats are more unilaterally contracted in effect or implication (Salgueiro, 2010) . Another common but not necessary asymmetry is that it is common in actual speech for speakers to employ the name of the speech act in their speech (e.g., "I promise you that…," "I'm warning you…," "My advice is to…," etc.), whereas issuers rarely use the word "threat" in their spoken or written threats, although targets may tend to apply the label to the act or use it as a credibility marker (e.g., "This is no idle threat I'm making"). Furthermore, recipients may often label the speech act in context (e.g., "Are you threatening me?").
There may be typological differences across certain contexts of threats. For example, (Simons & Tunkel, 2014) . Schoeneman-Morris et al. (2007) compared email to letter threats to members of Congress and found that emails were more likely to emphasize governmental issues, use obscenity, and reveal disorganization in language, and less likely to evidence psychological disorders or problematic approach behavior. Schoeneman et al. (2011) also investigated communication features that characterized threateners who engaged in problematic approach behavior toward political officials. They found that approacher communications revealed longer handwritten correspondence, references to specific events, demands, noting personal stressors, violation of their rights, and expressing intentions to approach. In contrast, threatening language itself was unrelated to actual approach.
Threats no doubt present substantial challenges to standardized search and identification criteria. Threats, like most language, are highly contextual. Consider, for example, the following two exchanges between hypothetical persons A and B: The content of B's speaking turn is identical in both interchanges, but clearly takes on a more threatening implication in the second exchange. Yet, by a priori notions of threat, there is little in the explicit or surface content of B's statement that seems particularly sinister. Whether or not threat content can be identified independent of such contextualizing information is an empirical question.
Assuming that threats can be reliably identified, the other major challenge is to distinguish threats in regard to their credibility. Spitzberg and Cupach's (2014) summary of 16 studies of stalker threats identified a false positive rate of 60% and a false negative rate of 18%, similar to estimates by Meloy (1999 Meloy ( , 2002 and Resnik (2007) . In a study of open source lone actor terrorists, Meloy and Gill (2016) found that only 22% engaged in pre-event warning behaviors that were considered directly communicated threats. Thus, many threats appear to have relatively little relation to the violence they portend. The credibility, or seriousness, of threats may be highly contextual. The prevailing wisdom is that judgments of threat message credibility is highly contextual and case-specific, requiring intensive evaluation of all case materials. There may still be significant practical value to more general forms of threat message identification in large text or 'big data' environments.
Computational linguistics is a rapidly advancing field that investigates ways of parsing elements of language, usually written text, to identify underlying dimensions and elements (e.g., Joacchims, 1998; Salton & Buckley, 1988) . Progress is being accomplished in discourse analysis in the discrimination of arguments (e.g., Bex, Atkinson & Bench-Capon, 2014; Faulkner, 2015) , narratives (Kypridemou & Michael, 2014) , beliefs, motives, justifications (Prentice, Rayson, & Taylor, 2012) , emotions (Oster, 2010; Westbury, Keith, Briemeister, Hofmann, & Jacovs, 2015) , conflict (e.g., Kaya, Ozkaptan, Salah & Gurgen, 2015) , sarcasm (e.g., Kovaz, Kreuz, & Riordan, 2013) , impoliteness (Marco, 2008) , group formation and membership (Tsou et al., 2014) , and intention (e.g., Feng, 2015) . © 2016 ADFSL Only a few computational linguistics studies have been applied to threatening communications (Carter, 2010 , Gales, 2010 Glukhov & Martynova, 2015; Smith, 2006 Smith, , 2008 Tiongco, 2015; Watt, Kelly & Llamas, 2013) , although several scholars have commented on the potential value of such analyses on threat messages (e.g., Cohen, Johansson, Kaati, & Mork, 2014; Leonard, 2005 Leonard, /2006 Sanfilippo, 2010) . Taylor et al. (2013) investigated the emails of "insider threats" in a game simulation, and found that language became more self-focused, more negative in affective tone, and demonstrated more cognitive processing load compared to normal coworker participants. Glukhov and Martynova (2015) selected a corpus of 525 threats spoken in interpersonal contexts in fictional texts. They content-analyzed these threats for several features, including the nature of the fear appeal implied by the threat. They concluded that although threats to health or physical security were more represented in the corpus, threats to social identity were more efficient in achieving concessions for the fictional characters.
Carter (2010) extracted corpora of terrorist and non-terrorist threats from public websites. The terrorist corpus consisted of 4,059 words, and the non-terrorist corpus consisted of 2,172 words. These two corpora were each subdivided into those sentences containing clear threatening utterances. Simple word count metrics were assessed on pronoun usage and sentence structure (negative command, command, command-then statements, if-then statements, questions, and declarative statements).
The results are entirely descriptive, but showed that the second-person nominative pronoun "you" (and lemmatized to include "you'll" and "you're") were most common. Grammatically, the subjective "I" and the objective "you" were the most common uses of pronouns. Declarative statements were most typical of specific threat grammar (e.g., "Now you're dead!" and "For this and other injustices, you will pay the ultimate price!").
Glasgow and Schouten (2014) examined a corpus of 60 documents sent to judges that raised safety concerns. Although only 3 of the documents "made clear threats of violence" (p. 41), 5 had vague threats of violence, and 16 threatened legal action, and another 8 threatened reputational attacks. Glasgow and Schouten applied a content and word software (LIWC;
Chung & Pennebaker, 2011; Pennebaker, Francis, & Booth, 2001 ; http://www.liwc.net/) that seeks evidence of emotional states of writers, and a topic model that statistically aggregates topical themes (e.g., see Weinstein, Frazier, & Bongar, 2009 ). The authors found little ability to differentiate serious from non-serious threats, although the corpus was recognized as under-powered. Sanfilippo, McGrath and Bell (2014) report a computer modeling approach using frame analysis (Goffman, 1974) , in which content themes and features are processed from terrorist messages, including: (a) moral disengagement, (b) message delivery, (c) seek resonance, (d) violence and contention, (e) call to arms, (f) social isolation, and (g) violation of sacred values (see also, Sanfilippo, 2010; Sanfilippo, McGrath & Whitney, 2011 ).
An ambitious project by Gales (2010a Gales ( , 2010b Gales ( , 2011 Gales ( , 2015 obtained a corpus consisting of 470 threat letters from the Academy Group, a consulting behavioral analysis organization employing former FBI Special Agents. The project sought to analyze threats through the lens of speaker stance and appraisal. Stance represents "the ways in which speakers and writers linguistically demonstrate their commitment to or attitudes about a person or proposition" (Gales, 2011, p. 27) .
Appraisal involves linguistic markers of speaker attitude ("how feelings are mapped within texts," p. 30), engagement ("how writers … dialogically position themselves with respect to their audience or to propositions referenced within the text," p. 30), and graduation ("to demonstrate greater or lesser degrees of positive or negative feelings," p. 30). From this perspective, she theorized that "stances relating to the emotions of the writer are outlined through the systems of attitude, while stances relating to the writer's level of commitment or investment are highlighted through the system of engagement" (pp. 30-31). Her case studies indicated, contrary to common predictions, that threatener language demonstrated ambivalent attitudes (i.e., disfavor of both the target's and self's actions) and ambivalent graduation (i.e., through heteroglossic utterances such as "may"). In a separate analysis of 397 threats (128,774 total words) from the same source, stance was used to differentiate threats in stalking cases, harassment cases, and defamation cases. Stalking threats were particularly characterized by prediction modals of will, would, shall, be going to, a strong co-occurrence of these predictions modals and pronouns (e.g., I/we, r = .88), trigrams (i.e., I will be and I will have indicating volition and possessiveness), verbcontrolled that-complement clauses indicating certainty (e.g., you know that) and intention (e.g., want, need, like) . Suggestive of the role of the credibility pragmatic of threats, Gales (2015) found that "verbs of certainty, which are linked to the epistemic function of language, are considerably more frequent in all categories of threats, in general" (p. 189).
Smith (2008) examined a corpus of 96 FBI threatening communication cases, classified as (1) no action by the threatener, (2) stalking or approaching, or (3) harmful action. She found several language content variables related significantly to action taken, including threatening to reveal detrimental information, threatening to stalk, using persuasion, repeatedly mentioned love or marriage or romance, used polite threatening tone, and words associated with prejudices regarding religion. Threat document features also predicted action taken, including typed or handwritten notes (vs. computer printed) and inappropriate capitalization, and using a true return address. She has more recently begun to incorporate various linguistic metrics into a software package for assessing seriousness of threats that demonstrates good discriminatory power with this same threat corpus (Smith, Woyach & O'Toole, 2014) . This computational linguistic system is most immediately exemplary to the current project. It employs an algorithm of seven weighted factors (www.threattriage.com), some of which can be extracted automatically from the language of a threat text: prior contacts, paranoid expressions, polite tone, mentions of lovemarriage-or romance, specifying the target, specifying the harm for the victim, and conceptually complex language). The language complexity variable is considered an indicator of planning capacity, which is interpreted as a proxy for intent. These seven factors demonstrated significant discrimination of threat-to-problematic action or seriousness in a data set of 89 FBI threat cases. The threat triage system continues to add closed cases to refine the algorithm and accuracy of the system.
Also, exemplary of this project's objectives, research by Tiongco (2015) sought to develop and validate a more holistic rating scale. The Communicated Threat Analysis Scale (CTAS) was intended as a holistic rating scale to assess the seriousness of a threat. CTAS seeks to assess five characteristics associated with threats: organization versus disorganization, fixation, time imperative, action imperative, and focus. Two exemplary closed-case threats were used as stimuli, one credible and one not credible. The CTAS was also compared to a known threat assessment instrument with © 2016 ADFSL similar guided holistic subjective format (WAVR-21; Meloy, White & Hart, 2013) . The
18-item
Likert-type scale demonstrated marginal to unacceptable reliability of subscales, although the scale and its subscales could be argued to be indexes rather than scales, thereby not requiring internal consistency (Streiner, 2003) . Construct validity coefficients between the CTAS and the WAVR were generally nonsignificant or modest in effect size, indicating little evidence of validity for the CTAS. There were also few differences manifested between the credible and the noncredible threat, or between the expert and lay raters.
Van Brunt (2015) also proposed a holistic rating scale of written messages. It is comprised of five factors, each with multiple sub-items: fixation and focus (specification of a target), hierarchical thematic content (narrative construction of the writer as a superior status protagonist), action and time imperative (indication of progression toward action through chronemic and spatial cues), pre-attack planning (subtle or explicit cues related to plan details related to threatened action), and injustice collecting (indications of a scorecard of having been wronged). This system is an entirely qualitative rating system, although some of its sub-items could be generated as template search ontologies or linguistic algorithms in big data contexts, such as target name repetition, graphic language, weapons mentions, and violence (e.g., Purohit et al., 2016) . Such rating scales may be particularly relevant to validating training sets of threats for machine learning and classification, as well as heuristics for case assessment.
There are probably other relevant features not yet identified (Leonard, 2005 (Leonard, /2006 . For example, certain metrics would be calibrationbased, such as sudden pattern changes or "bursts" of preoccupation with a particular topic, entity or person . Some forensic approaches capitalize on establishing baseline distributions of a given communicator, and scan for significant pattern deviations or discrepancies (e.g., Abbasi & Chen, 2008; Hadjidj, et al., 2009 ). Pennebaker and Chung (2005) demonstrate that there may be distinct patterns of affective tone before, during, and following a crisis (e.g., a terrorist attack). Furthermore, several of these features cannot be captured in single messages, but can only be validly understood in a broader context of a 'campaign' or 'relationship' in which a given message establishes its credibility in the context of a broader set of message exchanges.
Threats are clearly complex communicative phenomena. In everyday speech, as a commissive, threats are most characterized by their false positives-a failure to commit an act that is promised (Spitzberg & Cupach, 2014) . Such failure pragmatically places them more in the role of directive-influence attempts (i.e., directives). As such, a failure to commit an act is often taken as an ironic sign of the effectiveness of the speech act-the target's compliance foregoes the need to enact the harm implied by the speech act. Even though threats tend to demonstrate very high rates of false positives, they may yet reveal significant diagnostic and perhaps even predictive information about prospective acts of aggression. As Smith et al. (2014, p. 322) conclude: "A growing body of literature shows that a significant minority of threateners do approach or become violent subsequent to threatening…Research also indicates that the way people use language can have value for discerning their intent and future actions." the training set. In the third stage, the learning stage, texts in the training set are classified according to the social construct, by optimizing weights for the features. This stage combines two processes, weight assignment and feature selection. In feature selection, features may be eliminated to eliminate noise or merged to account for feature interactions.
The difficult part of applying this paradigm is stage one, finding useful and extractable features. A resource like the LIWC dictionary is the endpoint of a process like a stage one process, but the features in LIWC are only a starting point. Each application has its own set of useful features, and some demonstrably useful features may involve linguistically complex actions such as describing financial problems, or announcing a significant anniversary, which are SLP problems in their own right. An example of an approach to stage one is the work of Miah et al. (2014) , which uses a sentence similarity measure to cluster words associated with particular stages in child exploitation chats. Once words with strong associations with a particular stage are found, a LIWC dictionary is built, but with new features specific to child exploitation chats.
The threat message literature has identified a number of text features, of various levels of complexity, which might plausibly play a role in a threat assessment classifier, either to predict approach or violence. Gales (2010a) analyzes threat messages, trying to identify those that are most likely to produce fear or anxiety in their recipients. A corpus-based approach is used to focus on what are known as appraisal features, linguistic features that express or reveal the author's evaluative stance toward the subject. The features examined have considerable computational potential, because they can be extracted with relative ease. They include specific trigrams such as "I will have" or "I will be", verbs with that-complement clauses, prediction modals such as "will", and adverbials of stance expressing certainty, likelihood, attitude, and style (for example, "frankly", "kind of"), and verbs of intention. All of Gale's features are what are referred to here as content features. Not all predictive text features bear on the content of the text.
Of the various text variables Smith (2006) studies, the following showed some positive correlation with subsequent violent action: threateners (1) giving their real return address, either partial or complete (2) using a typewriter, (2007) discussed several text variables of considerable utility in predicting approach by the threatener using a corpus of threats on members of Congress. They identified the following content features in order of predictive power: discussion of personal themes, making a request for help, mention of entitlements owed the subject, mentions of matters of finance, discussion of injustice, discussion of government policy or human rights, identifying oneself, mention of stressors, appeals to patriotism, expression of an intent to approach, mention of upcoming anniversary, and discussion of contact plans. Schoeneman et al. also identified some noncontent text features with predictive power, including all caps in messages and general disorganization of the text.
Meloy (2011) identified a number of features found consistently to predict approach. Although focusing on non-text features, Meloy does identify several features © 2016 ADFSL and communicative properties that might possibly be detected automatically, including request for help, entitled reciprocity (the claim that something is owed the subject), and grandiosity (imagined importance, or the wish to achieve importance). The first two coincide with features discussed by Schoeneman et al. (2007) . Grandiosity and narcissism open a new text domain that may be important.
Recognizing abstract features of text like grandiosity or narcissism may fall between personality classification and recognizing psychological state. The literature on psychological content analysis has addressed both classes of problems. In 2005, a pioneering work by Argamon et al. (2005 Argamon et al. ( /2006 ) classified neuroticism and extraversion using linguistic features such as function words, deictics, appraisal expressions, and modal verbs. One year later, Oberlander and Nowson (2006) classified extraversion, stability, agreeableness, and conscientiousness of blog authors using ngram features. Mairesse et al. (2007) reported a long list of correlations between the Big Five personality traits (Norman 1963) and LIWC Features (Pennebaker, Francis, & Booth 2001) . Celli and Rossi (2012) used a very simple list of features to try to sort Twitter users into three classes (secure, neurotic, and balanced) using profile and timeline information. They successfully applied several the text features from Mairesse et al.'s (2007) data to their classification task (Table 4 ). These features may well apply to other psychological classification tasks, including recognizing grandiosity (e.g., use of exclamation/question marks, negative/positive emoticons, and number of long words).
Summarizing, the most promising approach to the computational problem of threat assessment is some variant of the SLP approach. Pursuing this paradigm seriously requires significant work on identifying a useful feature set. The work on textual threat assessment features suggests a number of easily extractable text features may be useful, but it also suggests that more abstract features may help, and abstract features like grandiosity pose classification problems of their own. Such approaches are distinct from forensic efforts to identify threateners (e.g., Abbasi & Chen, 2008; Jadjidj et al., 2009) . The contrast, however, is informative of potential connections between the approaches. The term stylometric analysis (SA) is generally used for text classification focusing on identifying some property of the author of a text, such as level of linguistic competence, gender, psychological profile, or just the author's identity. SA has played a role in Psychology, Language Pedagogy, Forensic Analysis, and Literary Studies. It has used a variety of text features (e.g., lexical, ngram, syntactic, and orthographic). Stylometric features may be extracted and clustered for a collection of texts to create "writeprints" for anonymous authors (e.g., Iqbal et el., 2010) or for problems of author identification or authentication. These approaches may be fruitfully combined with machine learning methods (Koppel, Schler & Argamon, 2009 ), such as support vector machines (SVMs; Diederich 2003; De Vel 2001; Li et al. 2006) , neural networks (Merriam 1995; Tweedie, Singh & Holmes, 1996; Zheng, Li, Huang & Chen, 2006) , and decision trees (Apte et al 1998; Abbasi & Chen 2005) .
All these machine learning methods have also been successful in a distinct class of text analysis problems focusing on properties of the texts rather than properties of the authors; the most relevant problems are sentiment analysis and affect identification (Poria, Cambria & Gelbukh, 2015 , Severyn & Moschitti, 2015 , Teng et al. 2015 . In this broader context, the success of neural networks, especially Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs), is important.
CNNs map word-level representations of sentences or documents into fairly low-dimensional representations of the entire sentence or document. They thus take into account, or try to take into account, the composition of word meanings into more complex messages. CNNs have been shown to be of significant help in sentiment analysis, although the shortcomings of a word-oriented approach have long been apparent in sentiment analysis, because diverse features of context may affect the final effect, such as when sarcasm is used.
The particular problem of threat analysis can be viewed as combining the two approaches of author-oriented analysis and text-oriented analysis. The psychological profile of the author is a significant factor, as is the content of the message. To this may be added a third component, identification of a particular kind of relationship, the predatorprey relationship, between the author and addressee. In two out of three of these components, it is entirely possible that key information is not encoded in the message, and that extra-textual features such as that provided by an author profile may prove essential.
The multi-modal nature of the evidence is one respect in which the problem of threat assessment differs from many other text classification problems. Another is that a multiple component system trained to address the three components of the problem separately may have the best success because the architectures best suited to each problem are different. For example, the identification of personality types or author types seems to benefit from class-specific feature sets (Abbasi and Chen 2008, Poria et al. 2015) . Finally, the best approach may be a "rating-based" approach that seeks to assign a numerical threat level (1-5). This is not simply a 5-class classification problem, since the training algorithm should exploit the fact that a 4 is closer to a 5 than to a 1. Thus the "metric labeling" technique of Pang and Lee (2005) , which they apply to SVMs, may be of help. The process of factoring the problem into simpler parts, each of which may be its own more tractable machine learning problem, is productive. There are well known ensemblelearning techniques for co-training such separate learners. Abbasi and Chen (2008) and Poria et al. (2015) provide good examples.
One final point worth noting: An important component of the progress made in text classification over the last few years has been the increasing use of dimensionality reduction. Dimensionality reduction has its mathematical roots in Principal Components Analysis (PCA) and the closely related Singular Value Decomposition. PCA has been applied to authorship identification by using feature covariances over sliding text windows to compute author-specific patterns. Recent work using neural net trained word vectors (Mikolov et al. 2013 ) has introduced another "deep learning"-based form of dimensionality reduction, and though the amount of data required to train such word embeddings takes us well beyond the size of any plausible forensically tagged dataset, various practical methods of adapting such vectors to specific tasks have been proposed. For example, Tang, Wei, Qin, Liu and Zhou (2014) 
